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We use two data sets, one from a large brokerage and another from a major bank, to ask: (i) whether financial advisors tend 
to be matched with poorer, uninformed investors or with richer, experienced but presumably busy investors; (ii) how advised 
accounts actually perform relative to self-managed accounts; (iii) whether the contribution of independent and bank advisors 
is similar. We find that advised accounts offer on average lower net returns and inferior risk-return tradeoffs (Sharpe ratios). 
Trading costs contribute to outcomes, as advised accounts feature higher turnover, consistent with commissions being the 
main source of advisor income. Results are robust to controlling for investor and local area characteristics. The results apply 
with stronger force to bank advisors than to independent financial advisors, consistent with greater limitations on bank 
advisory services. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years households have increased their exposure to financial risk taking, partly in 
response to the demographic transition and increased responsibility for retirement financing. 
Recent research points to differential financial literacy and sophistication across households, 
creating the potential for important distributional consequences of these developments 
(Campbell, 2006; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). 
In principle, financial advisors could ameliorate consequences of differential ability to handle 
finances by improving returns and ensuring greater risk diversification among less sophisticated 
households. Indeed, delegation of portfolio decisions to advisors opens up economies of scale in 
portfolio management and information acquisition, because advisors can spread information 
acquisition costs among many investors. Such economies of scale, as well as possibly superior 
financial practices of advisors, create the potential for individual investors to improve portfolio 
performance by delegating financial decisions.  
But delegation entails costs in terms of commissions and fees, and might give rise to agency 
problems between advisors and firms and between advisors and poorly informed customers, as 
shown by Inderst and Ottaviani (2009): on the one hand they need to sell financial products and 
on the other they need to advise customers on what is best for them to do.
1 The notion that 
financial advisors tend to be used by less informed or unsophisticated investors who could be 
easily misled by them, underlies much of the existing literature on financial literacy, the possible 
role of financial advice and the case for regulation of financial advisors is. Regulation and/or 
incentives are then needed to make sure that advisors contribute their expertise to promote the 
interests of these inexperienced investors.  
In this paper, we examine three questions. First, we ask whether financial advisors tend to be 
matched with poorer, uninformed investors or rather with richer, experienced but presumably 
busy investors. Second, how brokerage accounts run by individuals without financial advisors 
actually perform compared to accounts run by (or in consultation with) financial advisors. Third, 
                                                 
1 Stulz and Mehran (2007) review the existing empirical literature on the nature and implications of various conflicts 
mainly focusing on analysts. 1 
 
whether the estimated contribution of financial advisors is persistent across different advisory 
models such as independent financial advisors (IFA) and bank financial advisors (BFA). Direct 
performance comparisons are made possible by two unique administrative data sets: one from a 
large German brokerage firm that allows its clients choice of whether to run their accounts 
themselves or with the guidance of an independent financial advisor; and another from a large 
German commercial bank that offers (optional) advice to its customers with investment accounts 
The answers we obtain provide a novel perspective on the role of financial advice in individual 
portfolio performance. 
Our first dataset, from the internet broker, tracks accounts of 32,751 randomly selected 
individual customers. Our second data set contains full data of 4,447 clients of a German branch-
based commercial bank. Both datasets cover 34 months, from January 2003 to October 2005. In 
many respects, discussed in this paper, descriptive statistics for both samples paint a very similar 
picture of the role of financial advisors as econometric analysis that controls for investor and 
region characteristics.  
Involvement of financial advisors is found to lower portfolio returns net of direct cost, to 
worsen risk-return profiles, as measured by the Sharpe ratio; and to increase account turnover 
and investment in mutual funds, consistent with incentives built into the commission structure of 
both types of financial advisors. If anything, negative advisory effects on portfolio performance 
are even stronger for BFAs than for IFAs. This is consistent with greater limitations faced by 
BFAs in the range of products they offer and in the way they can confer financial advice to 
clients. 
Regression analysis of who delegates portfolio decisions presents a further twist. It suggests 
that advisors are matched with richer, older, more experienced, self-employed, female investors 
rather than with poorer, younger, inexperienced and male ones. In this respect, advisors are 
similar to babysitters: babysitters are matched with well-to-do households, they perform a 
service that parents themselves could do better, they charge for it, but observed child 
achievement is not boosted by babysitters but by positive characteristics of the family. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the role of financial advice in 
overcoming investors’ informational constraints and their incentives in handling financial 
portfolios in view of relevant existing literature. Section 3 describes the brokerage and the 2 
 
commercial bank data sets, the measures that we use to characterize portfolio performance, and 
the estimation procedure. Section 4 compares records of account performance with and without 
involvement of financial advisors. Section 5 studies econometrically the role of investors’ 
characteristics in determining which investors are matched with financial advisors. Section 6 
reports regression estimates of the effects of financial advisors on account performance, return 
variance, Sharpe ratios, trading frequency, turnover, and diversification. Section 7 presents 
similar results from the second sample on bank financial advisors. Section 8 presents robustness 
analysis for possible endogeneity of financial advisor use. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2.  The Role of Financial Advice 
 
There is a limited but budding theoretical literature on the possible role of financial advisors. 
Current theoretical work but also policy debate on financial regulation seem to be based on the 
idea that financial advisors know what is good for individual customers but have an incentive to 
misrepresent this and to take advantage of their customers, who are typically uninformed and 
cannot figure out the poor quality of advice. Regulation is then needed to make sure that this 
conflict of interests is dealt with.  
In a recent pioneering paper, Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) analyze ‘misselling’, i.e. the 
practice of misdirecting clients into buying a financial product that is not suitable for them. Their 
model emphasizes the internal agency problem between the firm and its sales agents. The agency 
problem is complicated by the fact that sales agents perform the dual task of prospecting for 
customers and of providing adequate advice to them on whether to buy a particular product. As a 
consequence, higher sales incentives will increase the likelihood that sales agents sell unsuitable 
products to customers. If this occurs, there is a probability with which the firm receives a 
complaint and has to pay a fine. To avoid misselling the firm can set internal suitability standards 
for advising customers and exert costly monitoring to verify compliance with these standards. 
The standards implemented by the firm in equilibrium are increasing in the fine (or equivalently 
in the reputation damage), the transparency of the incentive scheme, and in the effectiveness of 3 
 
monitoring, but they are decreasing in the sales incentives and the private cost for the agent to 
investigate the match between product and customer.  
There are two relevant implications for our study. First, sales incentives can lead financial 
advisors to systematically recommend unsuitable products to their clients that entail suboptimal 
outcomes on the client side. Second, due to agency costs from multitasking and monitoring, a 
firm employing sales agents (such as BFAs) would be expected to choose lower standards than 
an entrepreneur (IFA). Our findings below are quite consistent with these predictions and 
provide two further insights: (i) advisors may affect portfolio outcomes not only by 
recommending unsuitable products but also by encouraging excessive trading; and (ii) the notion 
that advisors have an edge over their clients need not refer solely to unsophisticated clients, but 
also to experienced but inattentive ones who fail to monitor advisors and the outcome of their 
activities effectively. 
The empirical literature on financial advice has so far mostly focused on whether 
professional analysts and advisors have an informational advantage to contribute to individual 
investors when it comes to predicting stock price movements. Ever since Cowles (1933), there 
have been questions regarding the ability of stock market forecasters and analysts to predict and 
reveal movements in the stock market.
2  
For example, Womack (1996) examines stock price movements following ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ 
recommendations by fourteen major U.S. brokerage firms. He documents significant price and 
volume reactions in the direction of the recommendation, especially for new ‘sell’ 
recommendations. He concludes that there is value to these recommendations viewed as returns 
to information search costs. However, new ‘buy’ recommendations occur seven times more often 
than ‘sell’ recommendations, suggesting that brokers are reluctant to issue sell recommendations, 
both in order to avoid harming potential investment banking relationships and to maintain future 
information flows from managers. 
                                                 
2 Early studies include Barber and Loeffler (1993) on The Wall Street Journal's Dartboard column and Desai and 
Jain (1995) on “Superstar” money managers in Barron's. 
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Metrick (1999) analyzes a database of recommendations of 153 investment newsletters and 
finds no evidence that newsletters have superior stock-selection skill. Average abnormal returns 
are close to zero; and even the performance of the best newsletters seems to be driven more by 
luck then by skill. In related work, Anderson and Martinez (2008) examine abnormal returns 
around stock recommendations by Swedish brokers. A sizeable share of abnormal proﬁts results 
from transactions before the recorded recommendation date, suggesting that tipping of customers 
may be taking place. However, given the small size of these abnormal profits (only 0.04% in 
yearly performance of total Swedish equity fund assets under management), the authors wonder 
whether clients are fully compensated for the costs of commissions charged by brokers.  
Barber et al. (2001) explicitly take into account trading costs from following analyst 
recommendations. They analyze abnormal gross and net returns that would result from 
purchasing (selling short) stocks with the most (least) favorable consensus recommendations, in 
conjunction with daily portfolio rebalancing and a timely response to recommendation changes. 
Although they find that such strategies would yield annual abnormal gross returns greater than 
four percent, they also show that abnormal net returns are not statistically significant. 
Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) compare performance of mutual fund ‘classes’ 
distinguished by their distribution channel: directly sold to investors versus sold through brokers, 
with correspondingly different fee structures. They find that funds sold through brokers offer 
inferior returns, even before the distribution fee, no superior aggregate market timing ability, and 
exhibit the same return-chasing behavior as observed among direct-channel funds.  Finally, more 
sales are directed to funds with larger distribution fees.  
Our reading of the literature on informational contributions of analysts or brokers to direct 
stockholding is that these may be present but unlikely to be exploitable by individuals given the 
trading costs they entail. Therefore, in a world in which financial advisors solely provided 
security selection advice we would expect the effect of financial advice on abnormal portfolio 
returns to be around zero on average after transaction costs. 
However, some researchers take a different angle and point out that, even if professional 
advisors do not have superior information that is exploitable for the normal trading within an 
individual account, they may be less likely to exhibit behavioral biases that hurt account 5 
 
performance. They could thus help either by running the account themselves or by encouraging 
investors to behave appropriately.  
A behavioral bias that has received considerable attention is the ‘disposition effect’, i.e. the 
tendency of some individuals to sell winners and keep losers when it comes to direct 
stockholding (Odean, 1998). Shapira and Venezia (2001) found that the disposition effect is 
significantly less pronounced among professional than among self-directed investors. Well 
trained advisors could therefore aid their clients in reducing the disposition effect, potentially 
enhancing risk adjusted portfolio returns. 
Advisors might also be simply able to moderate trading activity (Campbell and Viceira, 
2003). Barber and Odean (2000) show that some investors trade excessively in brokerage 
accounts, suffering transactions costs that result in significantly lower returns. Such behavior is 
often attributed to overconfidence, especially pronounced among male investors (Odean, 1998; 
1999; Barber and Odean, 2001; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2008). Shu et al. (2004) analyze the returns 
on common stock investments by 52,649 accounts at a brokerage house in Taiwan for 45 months 
ending in September 2001. They find a U-shaped turnover and performance relation rather than 
the monotonic one predicted by overconfidence: the most frequent traders in the top turnover 
quintile perform better than investors in the middle three quintiles. Other behavioral biases have 
been found to influence some individual investors, such as trading on the basis of past returns, 
reference prices, or the size of holding period gain or loss (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001).  
While the list of potential behavioral biases can grow longer, an important question - 
consistent with our approach in this paper - remains as to whether individuals who exhibit such 
biases are likely to make use of professional investors. For example, Guiso and Jappelli (2006) 
argued that overconfidence (i.e. the disposition of investors to overstate the value of their private 
information) reduces their propensity to seek advice. Indeed, the Barber and Odean data come 
from a discount broker that does not offer advice. Even if overconfident traders approach 
financial advisors, one might wonder whether financial advisors who earn sales commissions 
would actually discourage them from executing too many trades without some incentive scheme. 
On the other hand, financial advisors may help correct behavioral biases or investment 
mistakes when such correction is aligned with their interests. A case in point is diversification. A 
number of empirical studies find that many individual investors hold undiversified portfolios (see 6 
 
e.g. Blume and Friend, 1975; Campbell, 2006; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Financial advisors 
who earn commissions for selling mutual funds have an incentive to promote such sales and 
through them diversification of their client’s accounts.  
Taken together, literature suggests an ambiguous effect of financial advice on net returns and 
risk profiles of client portfolios. Although it seems to be rather unlikely that advisors enhance 
portfolio performance through informational contributions they might in fact improve the risk-
return profile by ironing out behavioral biases of their clients. Of course, such positive effects 
must exceed the cost of advice in order to yield an overall positive effect.   
Our paper takes a direct approach to the issue of the role and contribution of financial 
advisors. Recognizing both the potential informational advantage and the potential contribution 
of professional investors to controlling behavioral biases and correcting investment mistakes, it 
compares directly portfolio returns (net of transactions costs) and portfolio risk levels that 
investors actually accomplish on their own versus what they accomplish with the guidance of a 
financial advisor. It does so with reference to portfolios actually chosen and adjusted by 
investors, which include directly held stocks, bonds, and mutual funds; and it accounts for a 
number of investors’ and region characteristics observable in our data and for how they influence 
the tendency to use a financial advisor. Moreover, we are able to measure the effects of advice 
across two distinct advisory models (IFAs and BFAs).   
 
3.  Data, Measurement, and Estimation 
3.1. Data on Independent Financial Advisors 
 
The first data set we use is administrative information from a large German brokerage firm. 
It covers the investments of 32,751 randomly selected customers. They all had an active account 
with the brokerage firm over the sample period from January 2003 to October 2005. If customers 
opened multiple accounts we consolidated them into one single account. 7 
 
For each sampled customer we have information on date of birth, gender, marital status, 
profession (including status as employed or self-employed), zip-code of place of residence, 
nationality, and self-reported security-trading experience in years.
3 All information was collected 
by the brokerage firm on the date of account opening and updated according to new information 
that the firm has obtained from the customer in the interim.  
On average (not excluding account owners aged under 18), sample customers held 38.6 
percent of their account volume in the form of equity mutual funds, 47.4 percent in the form of 
single stocks (28 percent thereof in German stocks), 2.4 percent in the form of bond mutual 
funds, 3.8 percent in the form of single bonds and the remainder in the form of structured 
investment certificates, warrants, and other securities.  
Our administrative data set includes a variable that indicates whether a given brokerage 
customer is also a client of an IFA who registered with the brokerage firm. We know from the 
brokerage firm that, typically, advised customers were brought to the brokerage house by IFAs. 
About 90% of IFAs registered with the brokerage are former employees of commercial banks 
advising customers on investment accounts. They decided to leave the bank and become 
independent, thereby offering lower costs than banks and greater choice of financial products. 
Thus, they were able to persuade many of their former customers at the bank to transfer 
investment accounts to the brokerage firm. The remaining 10% of IFAs in our sample are not 
former bank employees but they instead joined a larger team of IFAs directly and built up their 
own customer base, again drawing mostly from former bank customers. 
At the time of account opening, IFAs had typically obtained a client mandate to place 
orders on behalf of the client. We do not have information on which clients fully delegate trading 
decisions to their IFAs and which only consult their IFAs for guidance and then place trades 
themselves. The brokerage firm offers several compensation schemes to IFAs. Only for a 
negligible fraction of IFAs are revenues dependent solely on assets under management. More 
than 90% of IFAs generate at least a portion of revenues from trades, such as sales commissions. 
                                                 
3 Self-reported trading experience is reported on a scale with intervals equal to five years. We construct a variable 
that has the interval midpoints as values and then add the number of years that elapsed since account opening to 
approximate total trading experience at the beginning of our observation period. 
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In the case of mutual funds the commission is a function of the upfront load the brokerage firm 
earns from the fund producer. 
Of the customers in our sample, 12.8 percent consult IFAs registered with the brokerage 
firm. More than half of these customers are IFAs’ former banking clients, with the remaining 
half (typically also former bank customers) having been acquired over the years, most 
importantly through existing customers' referrals. We cannot rule out that customers coded as not 
using an IFA obtain professional advice from outside advisors. This is, however, rather unlikely 
because such outside advisors do not participate in the fees and commissions paid by the client to 
the brokerage firm and must therefore charge their services on top of the full brokerage fees and 
commissions.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the total brokerage sample and of the two sub-
samples distinguished by whether sample customers were advised by IFAs or not, after dropping 
accounts that report age of account owner below 18.
4 As shown in the Table, 77.8 percent of 
account owners were male, and 47.9 percent married. Overall, 86.1 percent were employers and 
13.2 percent were self-employed, with the remaining 0.7 percent being public servants, retirees, 
housewives or students. Average trading experience as of January 2003 was 9.34 years. Among 
IFA-assisted customers, men are underrepresented relative to their share in the overall account 
owner pool, and so are married owners. Older owners (above 50) are overrepresented, and 
advised customers have on average more years of experience and larger initial size of accounts.  
All reported return figures are monthly and net of any transactions costs and provisions 
charged by the brokerage house on its own account or on behalf of the IFA.
5 Transaction costs 
and provisions are divided between the brokerage and IFA, with the bank typically earning 
                                                 
4 These are typically accounts run by parents on behalf of their children. Specifically, 796 investors in our original 
sample were younger than 18 on September 5, 2006, and the youngest investor in that sample was just under 6 years 
old. Tax advantages for parents arise because during the observation period there was a per person threshold level of 
interest or dividend income above which capital income tax needed to be paid. We have also run the regressions 
including investors under 18, but our results were hardly affected in terms of sign, significance, and even size of 
estimates, except for small changes in the estimates for age categories. 
5 Although we only observe net returns in our data and therefore cannot directly measure transaction cost, we know 
from the data provider that the bank and the IFA combined earn typically 100-200 basis points on clients with 
account volume greater than 50,000 Euros. For smaller accounts, this number is typically in the neighbourhood of 
200 basis points, although it can be as high as 300-500 basis points, due to front loads and kick-backs from mutual 
funds. 9 
 
roughly 30 basis points for transaction fees, account maintenance, and front loads, leaving about 
170 basis points for the IFA. There is a minority of advisors who follow a different business 
model: instead of earning front loads, they forward those to their clients and earn an extra fee as 
a percentage of account volume. As this extra fee is not run through the bank, it is not observed 
by us and it is not taken into account in computing returns and other measures of performance 
net of costs. Since we obtain negative effects of IFAs on account performance in econometric 
estimations below, the resulting understatement of costs in these cases, if anything, strengthens 
our findings on the role of IFAs. 
The monthly position statements list for each item the type of security (e.g. stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds etc.), the number of securities, and the market value per security at month end. At 
the start of the sample period (January 2003), average annual account volume was 10,963 Euro. 
We computed monthly turnover by dividing the combined transaction value of all purchase 
transactions for a given month by the average of beginning-of-month and end-of-month account 
volume. Average monthly turnover was 4.7 percent in our sample, but about double of this for 
advised customers. 
 
3.2. Data on Bank Financial Advisors 
 
In order to compare our findings across different advisory models, we also consider a second 
data set of investment accounts, this time from a large German commercial bank that offers 
optional advice to its customers through its bank employees assigned to this task. Unlike the 
online brokerage that likely attracts a selected sample of the German population interested in 
trading, the bank has a wide network of branches that reach a broad cross section of the German 
population. This data set consists of 10,434 randomly selected customers observed over a 34-
month period, from January 2003 to October 2005. For 4,447 of those, we have detailed 
information on whether particular trades were executed following consultation with a bank 
financial advisor (a bank employee) or without such consultation. Accordingly, we construct a 
dummy variable for bank financial advisor use (BFA) that takes the value of 1 if the customer 
has consulted with a BFA at least once during the observation period and 0 if the customer never 
consulted a BFA during the period. For comparability’s sake, we match these accounts to the 10 
 
same regions as in the IFA data set and use the same regional variables and (virtually) the same 
set of account owner characteristics as for the IFA sample. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the BFA sample. Again we distinguish between 
self-managed accounts and accounts (at least partly) managed by an advisor. Male account 
owners are in a minority in this sample (46.3%) and they are underrepresented among those 
customers who consulted a bank financial advisor before executing some trade(s). As expected, 
retirees and housewives are much more strongly represented in the bank sample than in the 
brokerage sample. They comprise just fewer than 30% of the observations and they are 
overrepresented among advised customers. The majority of account owners are at least 50 years 
old, and those above 60 are overrepresented among advised customers. The average account 
volume at the start of 2003 was slightly higher in this sample, namely 12,694 Euro. The average 
monthly turnover rate was 5.8%, somewhat higher than in the IFA sample, and smaller for 
advised customers than for those who never consulted a BFA. Given the different composition 
and advisory models of the two samples, it will be interesting to see if findings on the 
contribution of financial advice to account performance persist (or differ) across samples. 
 
3.3. Measuring Account Performance  
 
In this paper we are interested in the effect of financial advice on portfolio performance and 
portfolio risk and in particular on abnormal returns. In order to compute monthly portfolio 
returns, we assume as in Dietz (1968) that all transactions occur in the middle of a given month: 
 





















     (1) 
where: 
, p t V     = market value of portfolio p at end of month t; 
1 tt P   = market value of all purchases (including fees) between t and t-1; 
1 tt S    = market value of all sales (including fees) between t and t-1; 11 
 
1 tt E    = cash proceeds from dividends, coupons etc. received between t and t-1. 
Monthly returns from (1) are winsorized by treating returns that fall into the first or the 
100
th percentile as missing values.
6 We construct log returns and use them and the standard 
regression model in (2) to estimate abnormal (log) returns for each portfolio based on CAPM. 
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where: 
p D     = estimated abnormal return (Jensen’s Alpha) for portfolio p; 
p E     = estimated market beta for portfolio p; 
, M t r   = log return of the euro-denominated MSCI-World Index in month t; 
, f t r    = log return on the one-month Euribor; 
, pt H    = error term of regression for portfolio p. 
 
In order to test robustness of our results to the way abnormal returns are computed, we also 
present results for an alternative estimate of excess returns based on a four-factor model proposed 
by Carhart (1997) to measure portfolio performance. The model is specified as follows: 
 
,1 , 2 3 4 i t i i i m tititi t i t rR S M B H M L M O M D EE E E H         (3) 
where the intercept  i D measures risk-adjusted monthly abnormal portfolio returns,  , it r  denotes 
monthly excess returns on portfolio i relative to the risk-free rate which is captured by monthly 
returns on the JP Morgan 3 Month Euro Cash Index, Rm,t denotes the excess return on the market 
portfolio which we approximate by the comprehensive German CDAX Performance Index, 
                                                 
6 Extreme monthly return observations were treated as missing (and not set to the upper/lower boundary that would 
be customary for winsorization) because (a) they most likely represent erroneous data, and (b) we do not lose 




SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt correspond to monthly returns on size, value premium and momentum 
portfolios. The size portfolio return (SMB) is approximated by the difference in monthly returns 
on the small cap SDAX index and the large cap DAX 30 index. The book-to-market portfolio 
return (HML) is approximated by the return difference between the MSCI Germany Value Index 
and the MSCI Germany Growth Index. Finally, the momentum portfolio return (MOM) is the 
difference in monthly returns between a group of stocks with recent above-average returns and 
another group of stocks with recent below average returns. The group with above-average returns 
is defined as the top 30% of stocks from the CDAX index over the past 11 months and the below-
average group contains the lowest 30% of stocks from the same index over the same time period.  
 
 
4.  Performance Record of Financial Advisors 
 
For many brokerage clients, a natural first step towards deciding whether to use an IFA or 
not would be to compare the historical performance of accounts run with IFA involvement and 
those run without it. Similarly, bank customers would like to know if those who have contacted 
bank financial advisors have done better on average than those who did not. Even in the absence 
of official records (indeed neither the broker or the bank compute or print portfolio performance 
records for their clients), prospective clients may still be influenced by the experiences of 
existing clients through word of mouth.  
Figure 1 plots histograms of average monthly log returns over our observation period for 
brokerage accounts that were self-managed and for those run with IFA input. Self-managed 
accounts exhibit a more symmetric distribution, while advised accounts show higher mass at the 
lower end of returns. Table 1 shows monthly logarithmic returns. The sample mean log monthly 
return on IFA accounts over this period is actually lower than that of self-managed accounts: 
0.63% versus 1.01%. This corresponds to a difference in annual rates of return of 5 percentage 
points (7.9% for advised customers versus 12.9% for those who invested alone). Even though the 
brokerage house itself neither collected nor published such statistics, the difference seems rather 
hard to miss. Table 1 confirms that IFA accounts are also characterized by lower abnormal 13 
 
returns than self-managed accounts, regardless of whether we use a single-factor model based on 
the MSCI-World Index or whether we use a four-factor model based on German stock data. 
These lower returns offered by IFAs are combined with lower average variance of 
portfolio returns raising the possibility that they simply reflect an efficient risk-return trade-off. 
Strikingly, however, the sample average of the Sharpe ratio on advised accounts is also lower 
than that on self-run brokerage accounts, suggesting that advisees ‘paid’ on average a higher cost 
(in terms of returns) to attain lower risk than what was available to self-managed accounts. 
Figure 2 shows that the distribution of total portfolio variance under IFAs is ‘squeezed’ towards 
values closer to zero compared to what is produced by individuals managing their accounts, but 
Figure 3 shows a much greater heterogeneity in Sharpe ratios among advised customers than 
among the rest. 
Comparison of IFA and non-IFA accounts also shows a rather small difference in 
frequency of trades across the two types of accounts, but a much more pronounced one when 
average portfolio turnover (which is sensitive to the size of purchases) is considered: The 
average turnover rate is more than double for IFA accounts. Looking at Figures 4 and 5, both 
measures tend to be clustered closer to zero for self-managed accounts. In other words, IFAs get 
commission based on the volume of purchases and tend to exhibit greater purchases than 
individual clients on average. IFA accounts tend also to be larger, and are therefore associated 
with larger positions and trades. 
Finally, IFA accounts tend to exhibit far greater diversification than those run by 
individuals alone. The average share of directly held stocks among self-managed accounts is just 
under 60 percent, while that for IFA accounts is about 20 percent. This seems consistent with 
incentives to sell mutual funds that IFAs have. 
Table 2 presents a similar comparison for bank customers who have used the advice of 
bank employees prior to making trades versus those who have not. Accounts of customers who 
have resorted to bank advisors exhibit on average lower returns, comparable variance, much 
lower Sharpe ratios, and smaller shares of directly held stocks than those who did not approach 
the bench. Unlike what we found for brokerage clients, turnover rates of those who made use of 
bank advice were on average lower than of those who did not. 14 
 
All in all, performance records of IFAs and BFAs during this sample period do not appear 
favorable towards advised accounts, especially in terms of the risk-return tradeoff offered. The 
deeper question is, of course, whether these differences are due to financial advisors themselves 
or to the customers they tend to attract. It is to this household finance question that we now turn, 
focusing first on IFAs and then on BFAs. 
 
 
5.  Who Has a Financial Advisor? 
 
We first consider the nature of the matching between financial advisors and clients, and in 
particular which characteristics of the brokerage firm or bank client contribute to the client’s 
account being run with input from an advisor. A priori, two very different cases seem plausible. 
One is that advisors tend to be matched with younger, less experienced and less wealthy 
investors, to whom they promise to offer knowledge and guidance that will help avoid mistakes 
and improve account performance. Another is that advisors tend to be matched with older, more 
experienced and wealthier investors who can benefit from advisory services by saving valuable 
time and/or by improving returns on sizeable investments. 
Table 3 reports linear probability regressions of whether the client makes use of an IFA or 
a BFA, respectively. The first and fourth columns use as explanatory variables characteristics of 
the client and ten regional dummies.
7 The models in the second and fifth column control for all 
time invariant local area characteristics (including availability and cost of financial advice and 
characteristics of investors) by including zip code dummies (5,652 codes for the IFA sample and 
646 codes for the BFA sample).
8 The models in the third and sixth column include regional 
dummies and a variable that measures the GDP share of financial services per district (an 
                                                 
7 The German Zip Code (Postleitzahlen) is a five digit number consisting of the wider area that is placed on the 
thousandth position and the postal district (the unit, tenth and hundredth positions). Regressions in columns 1, 3, 4 
and 6 include dummies for broader regions (Dresden, Berlin, Hamburg, Hannover, Dusseldorf, Bonn, Frankfurt, 
Stuttgart, Munich and Nuremberg), while regressions in columns 2 and 5 include dummies at the zip code level. 
8 Results from probit models (omitting zip-code dummies) deliver very similar results to the linear probability 
models, and are available on request. 15 
 
intermediate classification between regions and zip codes). This specification will be discussed 
in Section 8, where we use it as first-stage regression in our instrumental variables estimates. 
We see that, given other characteristics, males are less likely to use an advisor, suggesting 
an analogy to the role of gender in trading behavior and reinforcing the view that males tend to 
have more (over)confidence in their ability to run financial investments. We also find those 
clients between 50 and 60, and even more so those over 60 years of age, have a significantly 
greater probability of using an IFA or a BFA, by about ten percentage points in both samples. 
The comparison group (i.e. the excluded age category) is investors younger than 30 years (but 
above 18). 
The variable log account volume serves as a scale or ‘wealth’ variable, and we focus on the 
beginning-of-period value to minimize endogeneity problems running from the use of IFA or 
BFA to account volume. All models indicate that wealthier brokerage clients are significantly 
more likely to consult an IFA or a BFA.  
Married clients are less likely to use an IFA, controlling for other factors, probably because 
spouses can be used as sounding boards both for investment decisions and for whether an advisor 
should be hired. An extra year of self-reported experience with the relevant financial products 
actually increases the probability of using an IFA. Being self-employed increases the probability 
of IFA use by a sizeable amount of more than six percentage points, while there is no significant 
effect for employees relative to remaining occupational categories in the population. We do not 
have information on the marital status and trading experience of bank customers so that we 
cannot analyze these effects in the context of the BFA sample. However, in this sample we can 
control for the professional status of investors. The coefficients of these variables are not 
statistically different from zero.  
Overall, our regressions show that advisors are more likely to match with wealthier (as 
measured by account volume), older, more experienced, single, and female investors. Such 
investors have better reasons to want to delegate to advisors than others in their area, such as 
high opportunity cost or low inclination to spend a lot of time managing investments, as well as 
sizeable wealth holdings. The results are remarkably consistent across the two different samples, 
and robust with respect to the inclusion of zip code dummies that control for unobserved factors 
at the local level. Since IFAs and BFAs alike are more likely to earn higher commissions on 16 
 
busy, wealthy clients, they seem to have chosen to go for the big players who have a lot to invest 
and little time to spend, rather than for the younger, smaller, inexperienced investors who have a 
lot to learn. 
  
6.  Independent Financial Advisors and Portfolio Performance 
 
We now turn to how IFA use affects various aspects of account performance once we 
control for client characteristics. Section 7 will then repeat this exercise for the case of BFAs. A 
first important issue in estimating the effect of using financial advisors on account performance 
is omitted variable bias. Even if we control for many variables, unobserved factors may still 
simultaneously affect the probability of using an advisor as well as account performance. For 
instance, our data do not report information on the willingness of account owners to undertake 
financial risk: clients who are more risk averse might be more inclined to consult an advisor as 
well as to invest in a safer portfolio, thus influencing account returns and variance. Financial 
literacy and sophistication could also influence both advisor use and account performance. 
Attitudes towards financial matters developed in formative years, e.g. through parental influence 
or observation of others in the parental social circle, could similarly influence advisor use and 
portfolio choice that links to account performance. Similar considerations would apply to social 
attitudes, such as trust in others, that have been shown to influence portfolio composition (e.g., 
participation in stockholding) and at the same time whether one entrusts the portfolio to a 
financial advisor. One can draw a longer list, but it seems clear that the effect of financial advisor 
on portfolio performance could reflect the influence of such unobserved factors. In order to 
attenuate this problem, we control for as many possible factors that are observed in our dataset as 
well as for regional dummies and a finer classification of zip code dummies. 
A second issue is the potential endogeneity of the choice of consulting a financial advisor. 
To the extent that performance is systematically different for advisor-assisted and self-managed 
accounts, performance itself (mean, volatility and other moments of the return distribution) 
might affect the choice of using an advisor. For instance, investors with low performing 
portfolios might be induced to choose a financial advisor because they are convinced by the 
media or specific campaigns that portfolios assisted by advisors have higher performance than 17 
 
self-managed portfolios. A negative correlation between advisor consultation and, say, returns, 
might therefore be driven by the effectiveness of these campaigns, rather than by a negative role 
of financial advisors per se. In Section 8 we will therefore complement OLS estimates by 
instrumental variable estimation (IV) in order to examine robustness of our findings, employing 
the local GDP share of financial services as instrument. 
 
6.1. IFA Effect on Portfolio Returns 
 
Table 4 presents OLS estimates regarding the influence of IFA use on raw net returns, and  
on abnormal net returns constructed on the basis of a plain single-factor and of a four-factor 
model in the spirit of Carhart (1997), respectively, to examine robustness with respect to 
estimation procedure and to the underlying asset pricing model. 
Columns 1 and 2 report estimates of the IFA effect on the average portfolio returns over 
the sample period controlling for investor characteristics and regional dummies. Model (2) in 
addition controls for time-invariant local characteristics by including zip code dummies. The 
coefficients of IFA turn out to be almost identical in both models. They are negative and 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level and indicate that IFA use reduces monthly log 
returns by roughly 0.4 percentage points. Thus, the lower returns found for advised accounts in 
the descriptive statistics survive controls for a number of personal and regional characteristics in 
OLS regressions. 
Even if IFAs reduce raw returns they might still be found to create value for their 
customers by increasing risk adjusted returns. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 report OLS 
regressions for alphas from a model with the return on the MSCI world index as the single factor 
(denoted Jensen’s alpha). The IFA contribution is again negative, once the characteristics of the 
account owner and region are taken into account. The coefficient estimates are very similar to 
those for raw returns. In columns 5 and 6 we examine whether our findings are robust with 
respect to the underlying estimation model for abnormal returns and choice of market index. We 
estimate abnormal returns on the basis of the four-factor model for German stock markets 
outlined above. Our estimates show that the strongly statistically significant negative effect of 
IFA use is observed regardless of whether we use a single or a four-factor model for estimating 18 
 
excess returns, and that the coefficients are again remarkably similar with the other models and 
with the descriptive statistics from Table 1. 
Across all models, male gender is found to detract from account returns, consistent with 
the literature on overconfidence. Years of experience tend to contribute to higher total return, 
albeit by a small estimated amount. This is consistent with some recent studies indicating that the 
magnitude of investment mistakes decreases with sophistication and experience. For example, 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) ask whether investor sophistication and trading experience eliminate 
behavioral biases, such as the disposition effect, using data from the PR of China.
9 They 
conclude that sophistication and experience eliminate the reluctance to realize losses, but only 
reduce the propensity to realize gains by 37%.
10 
The implication of our findings in this section is that involvement of IFAs with these 
brokerage accounts tends to reduce both raw return and abnormal returns, even after both 
investor and area characteristics are taken into account. Our results are consistent with the cost of 
financial advice exceeding the benefits from informational contributions, if there are any. 
Importantly, this does not necessarily imply that (some) IFAs engage in misselling. 
 
6.2.  IFA Effect on Variance of Returns and Sharpe Ratio 
 
The finding that IFAs tend to lower both raw and abnormal account returns, given investor 
characteristics, need not be negative by itself. It is a priori conceivable that IFA involvement 
lowers returns in exchange for ensuring that clients are exposed to smaller portfolio risk, and 
descriptive statistics reviewed above seem to be pointing in this direction. We therefore turn next 
to the effect of IFA involvement on the variance of monthly portfolio returns and then to the 
Sharpe ratio which relates excess returns to return variance. Table 5 reports our findings. 
Column 1 reports OLS results for a model with regional dummies, whereas column 2 
reports results when zip-code dummies are included. We find in both models that IFAs reduce 
                                                 
9 They proxy sophistication mainly by the number of trading rights (indicating the number of methods to trade) and 
an indicator of initial portfolio diversification, both at the start of the observation period. Experience is proxied by 
the number of positions taken by investor i up until date t, a time-varying covariate. 
10 See also Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Zhu (2002, Feng and Seasholes (2005), and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). 19 
 
portfolio risk in line with descriptive results. Being male, inexperienced, single, self-employed, 
and with a smaller account all contribute significantly to higher total portfolio risk. The results 
on the control variables are quite intuitive. For example, larger account volume should allow 
more diversification, and we indeed find below that larger accounts tend to have smaller 
portfolio shares in directly held stocks. 
Set against the negative results on the role of IFAs in influencing account returns, the 
moderating effect of IFA use on variance raises the question of whether IFAs enable account 
holders to achieve an efficient reduction in risk relative to the reduction in return. This question 
is answered by columns 3 and 4 in Table 5. Again, we present two regressions, one with regional 
dummies and one with zip code dummies. Both regressions show a statistically significant 
negative effect of IFAs on Sharpe ratios. Male investors are shown to obtain inferior risk-return 
tradeoffs, consistent with overconfidence; while more experienced or married investors tend to 
achieve better tradeoffs. Interestingly, the self-employed are seen to have a tendency to expose 
themselves to more risk than what is efficient for a given increase in expected return, and the 
same is true for older account owners. Finally, wealthier investors tend to achieve better risk-
return tradeoffs, presumably by exploiting economies of scale in asset management. We 
conclude from the results in Table 5 that IFAs tend to reduce portfolio risk but that risk reduction 
does not suffice to compensate for lower returns from IFA involvement. Bottom line is that IFA 
use decreases ex post portfolio efficiency. 
 
6.3. IFA Effect on Trading, Turnover, and Diversification 
 
Given our results on returns and risk, it is natural to ask what type of behavior underlies 
them. IFAs get commissions mainly when the account owner purchases mutual funds. This 
creates an incentive for the IFA to encourage the account owner to make fund purchases. The 
first two columns of Table 6 examine the effect of IFA on the number of purchases per month. 
These purchases exclude account transaction from corporate actions, periodic saving plan 
investments and portfolio transfers, so as to be more directly linked to the IFA incentives to sell 
specific financial instruments. We standardize the number of purchases by account volume as a 
scale variable.  20 
 
Our results imply a negative effect of IFAs on the standardized number of purchases. 
Purchases result in transactions costs and could contribute to lower net returns, but it appears that 
the negative effect of IFAs on net returns that is reported above does not result simply from an 
increased frequency of purchases. The regression does confirm the positive role of male gender 
found in other studies (see above). Financial experience is found to reduce the number of 
purchases, consistent with the finding of Dorn and Huberman (2005) that respondents with 
longer investment experience trade substantially less, but the effect is not statistically significant. 
Account holders between 40 and 60 seem to be significantly more likely to engage in purchases 
than other age groups. Subject to the proviso on interpreting age effects, this finding would be 
consistent with them being in the asset accumulation phase, prior to entering retirement. 
Although we did not find a simple channel through frequency of trading, this does not 
mean that IFAs do not respond to incentives offered by commissions. It is useful to recall that 
commissions are linked to the size of purchases and not merely to their frequency. The third and 
fourth columns of Table 6 examine the effect of IFAs on average account turnover over the 
observation period, defined in terms of purchases so that it relates to IFA incentives. They show 
a strongly statistically significant effect of IFAs on increasing account turnover. This could be 
part of the explanation for why IFAs contribute negatively to portfolio returns.
11 Again, males 
are more likely to have larger account turnover
12 and more experienced investors are less likely 
to turnover their portfolio frequently. Younger investors, between 30 and 60 years of age, are 
estimated to have higher purchase turnovers, as they actively expand their portfolios.  
A different perspective on the possible effects of IFAs refers to their role in encouraging 
diversification of the account. Given the incentives of financial advisors to sell mutual funds, we 
examine in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 the average share of directly held stocks in the account 
over the sample period. We find a significant negative effect of IFA use on this share, even after 
characteristics of account holders and areas are controlled for.
13 This finding is consistent both 
                                                 
11 Higher turnover might be motivated simply by commissions but also by an incentive of IFAs to justify their fees 
by rebalancing client portfolios (see e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1992). 
12 Indeed, Niessen and Ruenzi (2006) show gender effects even for fund managers. According to their estimates, 
portfolio turnover is lower for female than for male fund managers. 
13 Since the share of single stocks is bound between zero and one, we also run Tobit regressions. Results deliver very 
similar results to the OLS estimates, and are available on request. 21 
 
with the descriptive statistics at the start of the paper and the incentive of IFAs to sell mutual 
funds. It is also one channel through which the reduction in portfolio variance that we found 
above is likely to be accomplished by IFAs (Table 5). 
Controlling for other factors, male account owners tend to have a tendency to put larger 
shares of their account in directly held stocks, suggesting overconfidence in portfolio behavior, 
in addition to the gender effects on frequency of trading and on the volume of purchases reported 
in the other columns. Being married tends to have the opposite effect, presumably because more 
people are at risk and maybe vocal in encouraging diversification. Employees and self-employed 
account owners tend to invest more in directly held stocks, probably because of their increased 
social interactions and the greater likelihood of receiving relevant information in the course of 
their everyday business. Interestingly, experience tends to lower the share of directly held stocks, 
indicating that experience works more as a factor dampening overconfidence than as one that 
encourages account owners to handle the usually more difficult task of managing direct 
investments in stocks. The conclusion from the regression analysis is that IFAs seem to boost the 
volume of purchases, while reducing the fraction of the account invested in directly held stocks. 
 
 
7.  Bank Financial Advisors and Portfolio Performance 
 
Given the rather striking nature of these results on the contribution of IFAs to portfolio 
performance, the question arises as to whether our results are specific to the data set of brokerage 
accounts we considered, e.g. because of selectivity into these types of accounts, or because 
financial advisors are independent and not accountable to the financial institution. For this reason 
we consider a second data set of investment accounts, this time from a large German commercial 
bank. 
There are important similarities and differences between IFAs and BFAs. Our discussions 
with the brokerage and the commercial bank suggest that there are some similarities in incentives 
across the two advisory modes. For example, upfront loads for mutual funds, which are a key 
component of any incentive scheme, are typically fixed by the mutual fund producer and 
therefore identical for all sales organizations. Although the bank does not funnel all commissions 22 
 
through to its BFAs, it gives powerful non-monetary incentives to its sales force through its sales 
control system.
14 On the other hand, IFAs are not subject to the constraints imposed by banks on 
their BFA employees, e.g. with respect to the range of products they can offer to clients and the 
specific targets to be achieved. In fact, many banks not only narrow down the menu of financial 
products offered to investors, but also provide extra incentives for their agents to advise their 
clients to purchase funds or structured products produced by the bank itself or by one of its 
subsidiaries.
15 In summary, we expect the negative association between BFA use and portfolio 
returns to be even stronger than in the IFA sample. 
As with the IFA sample, we introduce regional and zip code dummies to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 present OLS results on raw returns, 
where use of a BFA is seen to have a statistically significant negative effect. According to this 
model BFAs reduces monthly log returns by 0.3 percentage points. This is a slightly smaller 
absolute effect than that implied by the coefficient for IFAs from Table 4 (which was -0.4). 
However, unlike IFAs, who were found to reduce overall portfolio risk, BFAs are found in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 to increase total portfolio risk.  
Given the negative BFA effect on returns and their positive effect on total risk we expect a 
strong negative effect on Sharpe ratios. The last two columns in Table 7 show that this is clearly 
the case. The coefficients of the BFA dummy are statistically negative (-0.18), with values that 
are considerably larger than the corresponding IFA coefficients in Table 5 (-0.05 in columns 3 
and 4). This pronounced negative BFA effect is consistent with our conjecture form above and 
with Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) who posit that advisory standards should be lower for BFAs 
than for IFAs because the latter face no internal agency conflicts with costly monitoring. 
When interpreting the coefficients of controls, the BFA results point to two relevant 
account characteristics: the gender of the account holder, with males exhibiting lower returns and 
more risky portfolios; and the initial size of the account, that is seen to contribute to higher 
returns, in levels or normalized by risk, and to lower portfolio variance. These results are entirely 
                                                 
14 Another similarity refers to legal fines for any detected misselling. Since they are a function of the loss to the 
client they should be identical across IFAs and banks. 
15 Yoong and Hung (2009) extend Ottaviani and Inderst (2009) to address this kind of self-dealing. 23 
 
consistent with our findings for IFAs above. The difference, if any, is that performance features 
of bank investment accounts tend not to be systematically linked to as wide a range of account 
owner characteristics as those at the brokerage firm. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 examine whether findings on BFAs can be traced to higher 
turnover rates (based on purchases) induced by BFA consultation. Our estimations yield 
statistically significant positive estimates for the role of BFAs on turnover. As was the case with 
Sharpe ratios, the BFA coefficients have larger estimated values than the IFA coefficients from 
the corresponding models in Table 6 suggesting lower advisory standards for BFAs than for 
IFAs. 
Finally, regressions for the share of directly held stocks reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 
8 confirm that BFAs, as indeed IFAs, tend to push customers towards investing in mutual funds, 
consistent with their compensation incentives. All in all, our analysis of the BFA sample 
produces remarkably consistent results with the IFA sample and seems to be pointing to 
systematic negative effects of financial advisors and not to statistical flukes or sample 
peculiarities. 
 
8.  Endogeneity of Financial Advice  
 
Although we define as advised portfolios those portfolios that are continuously assisted 
from 2003 to 2006, if performance is persistent over time one may suspect that portfolio 
performance actually induced the choice of the advisor. As mentioned in Section 6, in such a 
case, OLS regressions are problematic. In this section we carry out IV estimation to examine the 
robustness of our main findings to possible endogeneity of financial advice. Finding suitable 
instruments in our context is not easy, and the robustness exercise described below, based on 
regional variation, is indicative and unavoidably rests on  the validity of the identification 
assumption. 
We choose to exploit regional variability in the share of financial services over GDP, and 
merge our two datasets with administrative data available from the destatis files of the German 
Federal Statistical Office, which provides a broad set of structural data on some 500 local areas. 
The system of German zip codes is more granular than the regional grid of destatis. Accordingly, 24 
 
we map customer accounts to regions by assuming that all zip-codes in the same destatis region 
share the same structural characteristics.  
We motivate the use of the GDP share of financial services by reference to the potential 
role that the density of financial services plays in reducing the cost of gathering financial 
information: the greater such density, the more likely it is that investors are able to gather 
information from local sources more cheaply, substituting for financial advice. Our identification 
assumption is that regional proximity with financial intermediaries affects account performance 
by facilitating the matching of account holders to financial advisors, but not directly. The 
instrument is collinear with the zip code dummies, which cannot be used in the estimation. Note 
however that in the IV estimates we still use wider regional dummies. 
Table 3 reports the first-stage estimates in columns 3 (for IFA) and 6 (for BFA), and 
shows that being located in an area with a larger density of intermediaries reduces the probability 
of having an account run by an IFA or a BFA. In both cases, the coefficients are statistically 
different from zero (at the 1 and 5% level, respectively). 
The IV estimates for portfolio performance are reported in Table 9. They are based on a 
standard IV estimator (with a linear probability model in the first stage) and standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the local area level. With only one instrument, the model is exactly 
identified and we cannot provide a test of over-identification restrictions. However, we do find 
that the instrument has statistically significant impact on use of IFA (the F-statistic is reported in 
the last row of Table 9).  
It is encouraging that the signs of the instrumented advisor effects on returns, variance and 
Sharpe ratios remain qualitatively unchanged as compared to the OLS results, for both the IFA 
and BFA sample. In particular, we find that advised accounts yield lower returns and Sharpe 
ratios, and that the negative effects are larger in the BFA sample. Moreover, factors such as 
being female, experienced, and wealthier still contribute to higher returns, lower variance and 




9.  Conclusions 
 
We have investigated who tends to use a financial advisor, whether individual investors 
tend to produce better account performance on their own rather than with the help of financial 
advisors, whether results depend on the advisory model (IFA versus BFA), and whether they can 
be traced to trading behavior and security choice. We have also examined robustness of our 
findings with respect to asset pricing model, dummies for wider regions or zip codes, control 
variables, and estimation procedure (OLS versus IV). 
Our first data set tracks accounts of a major brokerage firm for a large number of randomly 
selected individual customers, who may or may not invest their portfolio with the help of an 
independent financial advisor (IFA). As suggested by sample statistics and confirmed by 
regression analysis, advisors tend to be matched with wealthier, older, more experienced, and 
female investors rather than with poorer, younger and inexperienced ones. Our second data set 
comes from a major commercial bank that entertains branches throughout the country. We find 
that also bank clients who tend to consult a bank employee prior to executing a trade are older, 
wealthier and more likely to be female. 
Descriptive statistics on account performance, seldom examined by financial practitioners 
themselves, paint a very similar picture on the role of both IFA and BFAs as that conveyed by 
regression analysis that controls for investors’ characteristics and characteristics of the region of 
the account. In both samples, accounts run with input from financial advisors offer lower returns 
than those run by similar investors without such input. Although IFAs use reduces total portfolio 
risk it still reduces ex post Sharpe ratios significantly. BFAs increase portfolio variance leading 
to even lower Sharpe ratios. 
Higher trading costs and the associated commissions earned by both IFAs and banks 
certainly contribute to these outcomes, since we find that advised accounts feature higher 
portfolio turnover (though not necessarily more frequent trading) relative to self-managed 
accounts. Consistent with their remuneration incentives, financial advisors tend to discourage 
account owners from investing bigger shares in directly held stocks. Robustness analysis 
suggests that our results on the negative role of IFAs are not an artifact brought about by 26 
 
endogeneity between account performance and advisor use and are not due to the way we adjust 
portfolio net returns for systematic risk. 
Our results provide a new perspective on the role of financial advisors that might be useful 
for theoretical and policy analysis of their conflicting incentives, their likely effects, and the need 
to regulate them. Based on our findings, it should not be taken for granted that financial advisors 
provide their services to small, young investors typically identified as in need of investment 
guidance. Indeed, the opposite is true both for the broker data and the bank advisor data we 
consider. The finding stands to reason: financial advisors with commission-based incomes 
naturally prefer to devote time to customers likely to trade on a bigger scale. However, it also 
creates doubts as to how viable financial advice is as a solution to the problem of limited 
financial literacy in the population. In view of the rapidly growing literature on investment 
mistakes, providing financial advice to inexperienced, naïve investors could be an alternative to 
trying to educate them in financial matters, but financial advisor incentives and tendencies of 
inexperienced clients might result in relatively few matches. Other alternatives, such as simpler 
products and carefully designed default options, may be more promising than currently existing 
forms of financial advice in averting negative distributional consequences. 
Our findings imply that many financial advisors end up collecting more in fees and 
commissions than any monetary value they add to the account. This raises the further question of 
whether advisors overcharge and should be regulated. While the case for regulation seems much 
clearer when advisors are matched with inexperienced investors, we found that negative effects 
appear even when the tendency is for experienced investors to be using an advisor. In such 
‘babysitter’ cases, it may be that investors are inattentive and fail to monitor the advisors and the 
outcome of their activities effectively; or that they are too busy to run accounts by themselves 
and are willing to pay a luxury premium to have their advisors run their accounts. What 
distinguishes these two cases is customer awareness of the financial advisor incentives and 
effects. Even if regulation is not warranted in both cases, transparency and information on the 
role and outcome of financial advice seem crucial. 
Moreover, this need is not limited to naïve, inexperienced customers but extends also to 
older, experienced ones. Questionnaires on investor experience, such as those dictated by MIFID 
(the EU directive aimed at increasing financial markets transparency and competition), should 27 
 
not waive the need for information regarding incentives, ensuing conflicts of interest, and the 
outcomes of professional financial advice in terms of portfolio returns and risks, even for 
experienced investors. Our study found, in two different samples, robust negative effects of 
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Descriptive statistics for the Independent Financial Advisor (IFA) Sample 













Dependent variables         
Log monthly returns  0.0101  0.0063  0.0097  0.0105  0.0089 
Jensen’s alpha  0.0098  0.0061  0.0093  0.0100  0.0091 
Alpha – four factor model  0.0093  0.0055  0.0088  0.0098  0.0100 
Variance of monthly returns  0.0032  0.0019  0.0031     0.0023      0.0027 
Sharpe ratio  0.2229  0.1916  0.2189  0.2419  0.1585 
N. of trades / account volume in ‘000  0.0861  0.0884  0.0864  0.0270  0.2609 
Monthly turnover rate  0.0405  0.0895  0.0468  0.0200  0.0865 
Share of directly held stocks  0.5777  0.2000  0.5295  0.5503  0.3838 
          
Control variables         
Male 0.7925  0.6739  0.7774  1.0000  0.4160 
Married 0.4812  0.4636  0.4790  0.0000  0.4996 
Employed 0.8655  0.8334  0.8614  1.0000  0.3455 
Self-employed 0.1280  0.1577  0.1318  0.0000  0.3383 
Experience 9.3415  11.1535  9.5684  5.8918  6.2182 
18Age30  0.0101 0.0415  0.0462  0.0000 0.2100 
30< Age40  0.0098 0.1180  0.2409  0.0000 0.4276 
40< Age 50  0.0093 0.2680  0.3346  0.0000 0.4719 
50< Age 60  0.0530 0.2287  0.1995  0.0000 0.3997 
Age > 60  0.0708  0.3437  0.1787  0.0000  0.3831 
Log Account volume in 2003  9.1588  10.2823  9.3023  9.2088  1.4917 
Financial services / regional GDP  0.0405  0.3008  0.3025  0.2859  0.0794 
          





Descriptive statistics for the Bank Advisor (BFA) sample 
 













Dependent variables         
Log  monthly  returns  0.0076  0.0040  0.0054 0.0041 0.0101 
Variance of monthly returns  0.0045  0.0046  0.0046  0.0004  0.0130 
Sharpe  ratio  0.4252  0.2662  0.3253 0.2834 0.4020 
Monthly turnover rate  0.0680  0.0520  0.0579  0.0300  0.1103 
Share of directly held stocks  0.2975  0.1188  0.1853  0.000  0.3009 
          
Control variables                
Male  0.5102  0.4350  0.4630 0.0000 0.4986 
Employed  0.4413  0.3501  0.3840 0.0000 0.4864 
Executive  employee  0.0284  0.0257  0.0267 0.0000 0.1613 
Housewife  0.0665  0.1034  0.0897 0.0000 0.2858 
Retired  0.1577  0.2205  0.1972 0.0000 0.3979 
18Age30  0.1203  0.0920  0.1020 0.0000 0.3033 
30< Age40  0.1644  0.0941  0.1203 0.0000 0.3253 
40< Age 50  0.1922  0.1385  0.1585 0.0000 0.3652 
50< Age 60  0.1753  0.1736  0.1742 0.0000 0.3793 
Age  >  60  0.3476  0.5016  0.4443 0.0000 0.4969 
Log account volume in 2003  9.0002  9.7146  9.4489  9.8033  2.1695 
Financial services / regional GDP  0.2978  0.2904  0.2932  0.2746  0.0745 
          





The determinants of having the account run by an IFA or an BFA 
 
 
 Independent  Financial  Advisor 
sample 
Bank Financial Advisor 
sample 
 (1)  (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male  -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.049***  -0.038**  -0.049*** 
 (12.06)  (10.92)  (12.32)  (3.14)  (2.15)  (3.16) 
Employee  0.057** 0.061** 0.058**  -0.054***  -0.039*  -0.048*** 
  (2.44) (2.52) (2.49) (2.93) (1.91) (2.61) 
30< Age <=40  -0.031***  -0.025**  -0.030***  -0.050  -0.060  -0.049 
  (3.32) (2.40) (3.11) (1.44) (1.49) (1.41) 
40< Age <=50  -0.004  0.004  -0.002  -0.013  -0.021  -0.011 
  (0.36) (0.35) (0.25) (0.38) (0.57) (0.33) 
50< Age <=60  0.023**  0.021*  0.023**  0.053*  0.042  0.055* 
  (2.20) (1.81) (2.21) (1.67) (1.16) (1.74) 
Age  >  60  0.088*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.112*** 0.089*** 0.113*** 
  (7.53) (6.71) (7.62) (3.87) (2.73) (3.89) 
Log  Account  Volume  0.045*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 
 (22.07)  (20.19)  (22.60)  (7.51)  (7.92)  (7.73) 
Self-employed  0.060** 0.064** 0.062**       
 (2.48)  (2.55)  (2.56)       
Experience / 100  0.159***  0.148***  0.165***       
 (3.45)  (3.03)  (3.58)       
Married  -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.025***       
 (5.61)  (5.10)  (6.06)       
Executive       -0.003  0.032  0.001 
       (0.06)  (0.59)  (0.01) 
Housewife       0.002  0.016  0.005 
       (0.06)  (0.49)  (0.18) 
Retired       -0.025  -0.009  -0.022 
       (1.11)  (0.34)  (0.95) 
Financial services / regional GDP      -0.238***      -0.324** 
     (6.58)      (2.53) 
Constant  -0.358*** -0.316*** -0.301*** 0.366***  0.303***  0.446*** 
  (12.58)  (10.34)  (9.85) (7.68) (6.58) (7.54) 
        
Observations  28,321 28,321 28,321  4,440  4,440  4,440 
R-squared  0.09 0.37 0.10 0.05 0.23 0.05 
Zip  code  dummies  NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note. The table reports estimates from a linear probability model of having an Independent Financial Advisor or a 
Bank Financial Advisor. Log account volume is measured in January 2003. All regressions include regional dummies 
(absorbed by zip code dummies where present).Asymptotic standard errors corrected for clustering at the zip code level 
are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent 
level; three stars at the 1 percent level 37 
 
Table 4 
The determinants of portfolio returns in the IFA sample 
 
 
 Log  Returns 
 
Jensen's Alpha  Alpha 4 Factor Model 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial  Advisor  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (26.45) (18.33) (26.88) (18.22) (27.03) (17.11) 
Male  -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (4.34)  (3.14)  (3.95)  (2.99) (5.37) (4.17) 
Married  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000**  0.000 
 (0.79)  (0.22)  (1.16)  (0.43) (2.12) (1.49) 
Employee  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001*  -0.001* 
 (1.57)  (1.43)  (1.47)  (1.39) (1.95) (1.72) 
Self-employed -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001**  -0.002** 
 (1.91)  (1.77)  (1.86)  (1.74) (2.35) (2.11) 
Experience / 100  0.002**  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 
 (2.28)  (0.98)  (1.58)  (0.43) (1.31) (0.53) 
30< Age <=40  0.000*  0.001*  0.000*  0.001*  0.000  0.000 
 (1.84)  (1.70)  (1.86)  (1.71) (0.89) (1.07) 
40< Age <=50  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.46)  (0.43) (1.36) (0.97) 
50< Age <=60  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.15)  (0.43)  (0.18)  (0.48) (1.11) (0.33) 
Age > 60  -0.001*  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001***  -0.001 
 (1.80)  (0.95)  (1.64)  (0.79) (2.63) (1.58) 
Log  Account  Volume  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (6.92)  (4.81)  (6.68)  (4.62) (7.51) (5.24) 
Constant  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (11.92)  (9.78)  (11.24)  (9.36)  (9.48)  (7.90) 
        
Observations  28,321 28,321 28,321 28,321 28,321 28,321 
R-squared  0.03 0.23 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 
Zip  code  dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note. Log account volume is measured in January 2003. All regressions include regional dummies (absorbed by zip 
code dummies where present). Asymptotic t-statistics corrected for clustering at the zip code level are reported in 
parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent level; three stars 





The determinants of portfolio return variance and Sharpe ratios in the IFA sample 
 
 





(2) (3)  (4) 
Financial Advisor  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.056***  -0.052*** 
 (14.74)  (9.95)  (13.87)  (10.92) 
Male 0.001***  0.001***  -0.022***  -0.021*** 
 (15.82)  (13.11)  (10.31)  (7.85) 
Married -0.000***  -0.000***  0.006***  0.006*** 
 (8.01)  (6.27)  (3.26)  (2.62) 
Employee 0.000*  0.000  -0.021**  -0.017 
 (1.77)  (0.24)  (2.10)  (1.39) 
Self-employed 0.001***  0.001***  -0.033***  -0.029** 
 (5.18)  (2.93)  (3.22)  (2.21) 
Experience / 100  -0.000  -0.000  0.056***  0.043** 
 (0.50)  (0.47)  (3.74)  (2.31) 
30< Age <=40  0.000*  0.000  0.001  0.002 
 (1.77)  (1.19)  (0.17)  (0.42) 
40< Age <=50  0.000***  0.000***  -0.012***  -0.013** 
 (5.46)  (3.99)  (2.59)  (2.33) 
50< Age <=60  0.000***  0.000***  -0.014***  -0.013** 
 (5.84)  (4.21)  (2.77)  (2.19) 
Age > 60  0.001***  0.000***  -0.018***  -0.015** 
 (6.22)  (3.99)  (3.58)  (2.45) 
Log Account Volume  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.023***  0.021*** 
 (39.58)  (31.94)  (26.96)  (20.47) 
Constant 0.007***  0.008***  0.066***  0.064*** 
 (38.35)  (32.36)  (5.22)  (4.12) 
        
Observations 28,321  28,321  28,321  28,321 
R-squared 0.12  0.31  0.05  0.25 
Zip code dummies  NO  YES  NO  YES 
 
Note. Log account volume is measured in January 2003. All regressions include regional dummies (absorbed by zip 
code dummies where present). Asymptotic t-statistics corrected for clustering at the zip code level are reported in 
parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent level; three stars 






The determinants of trading, turnover and diversification in the IFA sample 
 
 
 Number  of  Trades 
 
Turnover Rate  Share of Single Stocks 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial Advisor  -0.008***  -0.009**  0.062***  0.053***  -0.353***  -0.341*** 
  (2.59)  (2.14)  (16.77) (15.21) (47.19) (37.72) 
Male  0.035*** 0.036*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 
  (16.04) (12.32) (16.10) (13.15) (14.71) (12.37) 
Married  0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000  -0.027***  -0.029*** 
  (0.32) (0.19) (1.37) (0.14) (6.03) (5.03) 
Employee -0.010  -0.015  -0.001  -0.001  0.082***  0.068** 
  (0.80) (0.89) (0.19) (0.26) (2.94) (1.99) 
Self-employed -0.006  -0.012  -0.004  -0.005  0.128***  0.108*** 
  (0.46) (0.71) (0.99) (0.91) (4.47) (3.10) 
Experience / 100  -0.020  -0.003  -0.073***  -0.054***  -0.571***  -0.556*** 
  (1.07) (0.12) (8.58) (5.42)  (15.22)  (11.91) 
30< Age <=40  0.005  0.004  0.004**  0.003  0.000  0.001 
  (1.39) (0.80) (2.05) (1.17) (0.03) (0.04) 
40< Age <=50  0.015***  0.016***  0.010***  0.009***  0.028**  0.026* 
  (4.02) (2.95) (4.29) (3.44) (2.50) (1.88) 
50<  Age  <=60  0.024*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 
  (5.35) (4.28) (6.53) (4.78) (5.06) (4.33) 
Age  >  60  0.020*** 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.077*** 0.072*** 
  (4.11) (3.17) (4.28) (3.50) (6.27) (4.74) 
Log Account Volume  0.015***  0.016***  -0.009***  -0.007***  -0.027***  -0.030*** 
  (13.23) (10.75) (15.95) (12.03) (17.05) (14.69) 
Constant  -0.097***  -0.093*** 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.689*** 0.735*** 
  (6.21)  (4.57)  (16.08) (12.43) (21.07) (18.62) 
        
Observations  28,303 28,303 28,321 28,321 28,321 28,321 
R-squared  0.02 0.21 0.07 0.32 0.14 0.32 
Zip  code  dummies  NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
Note. Number of trades is expressed as a fraction of account volume in ‘000. Log account volume is measured in 
January 2003. All regressions include regional dummies (absorbed by zip code dummies where present). Asymptotic t-
statistics corrected for clustering at the zip code level are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical 







The determinants of portfolio returns, variance and Sharpe ratio in the BFA sample 
 





(2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Financial Advisor  -0.003***  -0.003***  0.001***  0.001*  -0.180***  -0.178*** 
  (9.20) (8.07) (2.80) (1.92)  (12.20)  (10.20) 
Male 0.001**  0.001*  0.001***  0.001***  -0.031**  -0.033** 
  (2.18) (1.75) (3.05) (2.63) (2.37) (2.13) 
Employee 0.001***  0.001*  0.001  0.001  -0.008  -0.005 
  (2.59) (1.88) (1.49) (0.92) (0.47) (0.25) 
Executive 0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.013  -0.030 
  (1.37) (1.57) (1.46) (1.33) (0.31) (0.65) 
Housewife  0.001 0.001* 0.000  0.000 0.008 0.020 
  (1.58) (1.70) (0.19) (0.14) (0.34) (0.72) 
Retired -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.010  0.001 
  (0.27) (0.48) (0.22) (0.58) (0.53) (0.04) 
30< Age <=40  0.001*  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.034  0.029 
  (1.86) (1.49) (0.09) (0.14) (1.21) (0.86) 
40< Age <=50  0.000  0.000  0.002*  0.001  0.023  0.010 
  (0.41) (0.32) (1.87) (1.46) (0.91) (0.33) 
50< Age <=60  -0.000  -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.023  0.015 
  (0.64) (1.08) (0.52) (0.65) (0.81) (0.46) 
Age  >  60  -0.002**  -0.002**  0.001  0.001 0.028 0.012 
  (2.58) (2.33) (0.88) (1.21) (1.10) (0.40) 
Log Account Volume  0.001***  0.000***  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.023***  0.024*** 
  (5.44) (3.81) (8.04) (7.15) (5.08) (4.85) 
Constant 0.001  0.003**  0.013***  0.013***  0.197***  0.210*** 
  (1.01) (2.18) (8.47) (8.58) (4.33) (4.48) 
            
Observations  4,440  4,440  4,440  4,440 4,440 4,440 
R-squared  0.06  0.20  0.04  0.19 0.05 0.19 
Zip code dummies  NO  YES  NO  YES  NO  YES 
 
Note. Log account volume is measured in January 2003. All regressions include regional dummies (absorbed by zip 
code dummies where present). Asymptotic t-statistics corrected for clustering at the zip code level are reported in 
parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent level; three stars 









 Turnover  Rate 
 
Share of Single Stocks 
 (1) 
 
(2) (3) (4) 
Financial Advisor  0.099***  0.121***  -0.158***  -0.148*** 
 (6.11)  (5.91)  (16.31)  (13.22) 
Male 0.072***  0.075***  0.056***  0.055*** 
  (4.72) (4.37) (5.88) (4.85) 
Employee 0.041**  0.019  0.045***  0.037*** 
  (1.98) (0.82) (3.66) (2.59) 
Executive 0.147**  0.137**  0.046  0.054* 
  (2.43) (2.02) (1.63) (1.72) 
Housewife 0.035  0.029  0.010  0.004 
  (1.07) (0.76) (0.62) (0.19) 
Retired 0.038  0.023  -0.016  -0.019 
  (1.54) (0.84) (1.16) (1.16) 
30< Age <=40  0.011  0.046  0.072***  0.079*** 
  (0.38) (1.32) (3.69) (3.52) 
40< Age <=50  0.016  0.038  0.088***  0.099*** 
  (0.56) (1.19) (4.69) (4.45) 
50< Age <=60  0.051*  0.069**  0.053***  0.061*** 
  (1.87) (2.14) (3.04) (3.02) 
Age > 60  -0.012  0.016  0.014  0.029 
  (0.47) (0.55) (0.85) (1.58) 
Log Account Volume  0.065***  0.062***  -0.006***  -0.008*** 
 (14.85)  (12.42)  (2.70)  (2.90) 
Constant -0.339***  -0.368***  0.275***  0.267*** 
 (6.53)  (7.07)  (10.04)  (9.73) 
        
Observations 4,440  4,440  4,440  4,440 
R-squared  0.10 0.26 0.13 0.26 
Zip  code  dummies NO YES NO YES 
 
Note. Log account volume is measured in January 2003. All regressions include regional dummies (absorbed by zip 
code dummies where present). Asymptotic t-statistics corrected for clustering at the zip code level are reported in 
parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent level; three stars 




Instrumental variable regressions for the IFA and BFA sample 
 
 
  Independent Financial Advisor sample 
 
Bank Financial Advisor sample 


















(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Financial Advisor  -0.012***  -0.002**  -0.166***  -0.023***  0.003  -0.529* 
  (3.68) (2.54) (3.27) (2.60) (0.34) (1.73) 
Male  -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.029***  -0.000  0.001**  -0.048** 
  (4.20) (6.99) (7.64) (0.38) (2.27) (2.30) 
Married -0.000  -0.000***  0.004       
  (0.58) (7.58) (1.53)       
Employee  -0.000 0.000** -0.015  0.000  0.001  -0.026 
  (0.54) (2.14) (1.31) (0.12) (1.17) (1.12) 
  (2.97) (0.39) (4.24)       
30< Age <=40  0.000  0.000  -0.003  0.000  0.000  0.017 
  (0.80) (1.08) (0.53) (0.43) (0.18) (0.49) 
40< Age <=50  -0.000  0.000***  -0.013***  0.000  0.002*  0.019 
  (0.44) (5.31) (2.59) (0.06) (1.89) (0.64) 
50< Age <=60  0.000  0.000***  -0.011**  0.001  0.000  0.041 
  (0.69) (5.97) (2.10) (0.59) (0.32) (1.16) 
Age  >  60  0.000  0.001***  -0.009 0.000 0.001 0.067 
  (0.44) (5.57) (1.21) (0.34) (0.37) (1.45) 
Log  Account  Volume  0.001*** -0.000*** 0.028*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.032*** 
  (4.66) (11.75)  (11.60) (4.37)  (4.09)  (3.42) 
Self-employed -0.001  0.001***  -0.027**       
  (0.86) (5.23) (2.31)       
Experience / 100  0.003***  0.000  0.073***       
Executive      0.001  0.002  -0.014 
      (0.95)  (1.47)  (0.32) 
Housewife      0.001  0.000  0.009 
      (1.13)  (0.18)  (0.34) 
Retired      -0.001  -0.000  -0.019 
      (0.90)  (0.13)  (0.83) 
Constant  0.005*** 0.007***  0.027  0.009**  0.012*** 0.325*** 
  (4.02) (18.28) (1.20)  (2.31)  (3.28)  (2.72) 
        
Observations  28,321  28,321  28,321  4,440 4,440 4,440 
Cragg-Donald  F-statistic  43.30 43.30 43.30 11.23 11.23 11.23 
 
Note. The instrument is the GDP ratio of the financial asset share at the zip code level. The first stage regressions are 
reported in column 3 (IFA sample) and column 6 (BFA sample) of Table 3 Log account volume is measured in January 
2003. All regressions include regional dummies (absorbed by zip code dummies where present). Asymptotic t-statistics 
corrected for clustering at the zip code level are reported in parentheses. One star denotes statistical significance at the 
10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent level; three stars at the 1 percent level. 